The News Editorial Analysis 3rd Jan 2022
₹8 lakh income ‘reasonable’ cap for EWS quota, Centre tells SC
Collection of details to update National Population Register put off till September
A government committee report in the Supreme Court has said that “income” is a “feasible criterion” for defining the “Economically Weaker Sections” (EWS) in society, and the annual family income of ₹8 lakh is a “reasonable” threshold to determine EWS in order to extend reservation in admissions and jobs.
“A feasible criterion for defining EWS can be based on income [family income]. A threshold of ₹8 lakh of annual family income, in the current situation, seems reasonable for determining EWS,” the report of the committee, submitted as part of a government affidavit, concluded.
The committee did not agree with the notion that the Union government had “mechanically adopted” ₹8 lakh as a number because it was also used for the OBC creamy layer cut-off.
Not same
It said the income criterion for EWS was “more stringent” than the one for the OBC creamy layer.
“Firstly, EWS’s criteria relates to the financial year prior to the year of application whereas the income criterion for the creamy layer in OBC category is applicable to gross annual income for three consecutive years,” the committee said.
Census first phase, NPR data collection deferred
The second and main phase of the decennial exercise — the population enumeration — was to be concluded by March 5, 2021.
There was a ban on the States to create new administrative units from January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2021.
The RGI informed the States in July 2020 that after the outbreak of the pandemic, the field work of the first phase of Census 2021 and the other related activities had been postponed until further orders.
Finalisation of administrative units entails covering all jurisdictional changes in an administrative area between two consecutive censuses. According to provisional data compiled by the RGI till June 2021 and accessed by The Hindu, the number of districts has gone up from 640 in 2011 to 736.
The sub-districts are up from 5,925 to 6,754, statutory towns from 4,041 to 4,657, census towns from 3,892 to 5,050, but villages have decreased from 6,40,934 in 2011 to 6,39,083 in 2021.
For Census 2021, all the changes between January 1, 2010 i.e. after the date of freezing of boundaries for Census 2011 up to the date of freezing of boundaries for forthcoming exercise (presently up to June 30, 2022) are to be considered for finalising the administrative units.
The preparation of an unambiguous list of administrative units is termed as “Census Frame” covering the entire area but without omission or duplication of any administrative unit at any level.
This NSP cannot change Pakistan’s direction
Without cooperative ties with India, the Pakistan people may not have human security or a successful economy
At its 36th meeting on December 27, 2021, Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC) approved the country’s “first ever” National Security Policy (NSP). Seven years in the making, the NSP is designed to be a “Comprehensive National Security Framework” and covers a five-year period from 2022-26. The NSP seeks to ensure the “safety, security and dignity of the citizen of Pakistan”. To achieve this objective, it puts “economic security” at its “core”. Apart from economic and military matters the NSP also covers issues relating to foreign policy, terrorism, water security and demographics. Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, who chaired the NSC meeting, called the NSP’s approval a “historic moment”. Pakistan’s cabinet endorsed the NSP on December 28.
Marks a fundamental change
Significantly, a public version of the NSP has not been released as yet. According to a press release by the office of the Pakistan Prime Minister it will be done “in due course”. However, Pakistan’s National Security Adviser, Moeed W. Yusuf said on December 28 that it will be done within a week to 10 days. Should it be released soon, it would show that a kind of consensus has been achieved between the elected government and the Pakistan Army on the NSP. A delay, however, could be indicative of remaining difficulties.
But even if the army is ostensibly on board, the question is whether it is willing to turn Pakistan away, in the true sense, from being a hard military security state into a state where the military competes for resources with other state institutions and the final decision is taken by the political leadership. The logic of giving primacy to the economy is that national policies will be directed through resource allocation towards development. That would mark a fundamental change in Pakistan’s direction, for it would reduce the army’s demand for resources.
It’s the Army first
The Pakistan Army has always laid first claim on the country’s revenues. It has never allowed light to fully shine on the defence expenditure. Nor, for that matter, does it allow scrutiny of its vast network of business enterprises and real estate for the benefit of its officers and men. From time to time, some officers have laid stress on the importance of “geo-economics” but seldom has the army shown any willingness to divert resources from defence to other areas. And, it has convinced the majority of the people that sacrifices have to be made for national defence because of enemies external, principally India, and internal.
More than 40 years ago during Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq’s period, a Pakistani comparing India to his own country told me that his country’s army controlled everything in the name of defence, but “what is it really defending but itself”? Despite the passage of time and the geo-political global and regional transformation, the veracity of my interlocutor’s assertion holds true today too. Thus, if the NSP is to mark a substantial change in Pakistan’s systems and governance, the first step has to be transparency in actual military expenditures and the dismantling of what the brave Pakistani scholar Ayesha Siddiqa terms as “Mil.Inc.”. That does not seem to be on the horizon.
An ‘India obsession’
In the NSP’s context, the question that Pakistan also needs to ask itself is this: can it ever achieve human security for its people and put the country on the path of normalcy and growth without radically changing its India policy? As the product of the two-nation theory, Pakistan has defined its very identity — to put it crudely but bluntly — thus: it is what India is not. Almost 75 years since its creation, Pakistan continues its search for a positive identity which will allow it to give up its India obsession. Its so-called commitment to the ‘Kashmir cause’ is a sub-set of its overall negative approach to India. This deep-seated hostility has prevented it from adopting rational policies towards India. Rational approaches would have enabled it to ‘legally’ adhere to its positions but ‘practically’ have ties with India in areas that would be in its national interest.
An example of its irrational approach is the position it has taken on the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) issue after the constitutional changes of August 5, 2019. Pakistan could have maintained its stand on J&K and yet traded with India as that was in its interest to do so. Instead, it decided to suspend the abridged commercial relationship that existed. Countries can adopt selective approaches to register protests. A sacrifice of interests is especially futile where such sacrifice does not yield results as it obviously has not, from Pakistan’s standpoint, on J&K developments, post 2019.
While Pakistan’s ideology and mindset prevents it from developing realistic ties with India, it also has a bearing on its social development and the economic management of the country apart from draining resources from development to defence. Pakistan aspires to become a society imbued with moderate Islamic faith. However, its security apparatus has actively sought to use Islamism against India. This has led it to pander to violent sectarian groups and marginalise progressive elements of civil society. The culture of Islamism is illustrated by the veneration of the grave of Mumtaz Qadri, the killer of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer. It is astonishing that Qadri who was executed for the crime of murdering one he was duty bound to protect was lauded by millions for serving the cause of Islam by killing Taseer who was perceived to be sympathising with a blasphemy accused. There is another aspect. Islamist forces are also allies of feudal elements in the Pakistani political elite, and together they support inimical and irrational policies towards India, including in economic and commercial sectors.
China as anchor
The natural economic partner for a country such as Pakistan is a large neighbour. This is especially so in an era when economies are not barricaded as some were for several decades in the second half of the previous century. Stoutly refusing to open up trade with India, Pakistan has looked to other economic and commercial partners among whom China is by far the most important. The security relationship was the anchor of the China-Pakistan ties. Now, Pakistan hopes that China will offer its assistance to transform its economy. It looks to the mechanisms under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to play a crucial role through connectivity, port development, power production and other investments. All this may be of some help but they cannot be a substitute to be integrated with a large neighbouring economy.
That can only come about with the opening of trade and connectivity with India. Over 25 years ago, Chinese President Jiang Zemin had, in an address to the Pakistani Senate, spoken of the need to temporarily shelve disputes so that they do not impact inter-state ties. He may have mentioned this in the context of Chinese-South Asian ties, but these comments applied to Pakistani approaches to its neighbours as well. But Jiang Zemin’s words were simply ignored by the Pakistanis. Today, with the regional and international context entirely changed, it is unlikely that President Xi Jinping will give Pakistan the same advice. However, that does not erode the veracity of Jiang Zemin’s views.
Thus, irrespective of what the NSP may state, the Pakistan people can neither have human security nor a successful economy without cooperative ties with India. That the Pakistan Army and the political elite are unwilling to have. The NSP, therefore, cannot change Pakistan’s unhappy direction.
Vivek Katju is a retired Indian Foreign Service officer
From selective to universal engagement
The remarkable hyper activism of Indian foreign policy will be the legacy of 2021, though the COVID-19 situation was not congenial for travel, high-level meetings on sensitive matters and protocol. Those who travelled ran the risk of falling sick in foreign lands. Every time I saw External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar braving it all with a mask that covered much of his stern and unsmiling face, with the demeanor and stride of a determined crusader, I whispered a prayer for my former colleague’s safety. At a time when diplomacy had retreated behind laptops, he unhesitatingly undertook extensive journeys, making him the most visible face of India last year.
The activism was inevitable with geopolitics having turned topsy-turvy not only by the pandemic, but also by the events before and after it through periodical elections, which brought new dramatis personae to the centre stage, and the volatility of the economic and political changes across the world. The pandemic turned the wind of change into a whirlwind and it became necessary for nations to move fast even to stay in their positions. The paradigm shift in foreign policy was palpable and the field was open to nimble-footed and decisive governments, not to hesitant, doubting, calculating ones. A decisive Prime Minister and a seasoned diplomat as the External Affairs Minister (EAM) rose to the challenges of the times for India.
Priorities in 2021
Coping with the change from President Donald Trump to President Joe Biden and the consequent changes in U.S. policy were big enough to keep the world leaders on tenterhooks. But even that appeared small against the increased onslaught of the pandemic. India suddenly became the epicentre of the tragedy after a relatively easy period which gave it the honor of being the pharmacy of the world. The exposure of the inefficiency of India’s health system and the panic caused by pictures of unattended funeral pyres put the country in the defensive and weakened its credibility as it tried to contribute to the resolution of global issues. Every global forum was compelled to find vaccines, medicines, masks and sanitisers when it met to deal with political and economic crises.
For India, the biggest preoccupation of 2021 was the effort to get China to disengage in areas in Ladakh. Dialogue, military preparedness and economic pressure met with limited success. The sooner we achieve disengagement in the remaining sectors, the better it will be for India to be more effective in the other areas of concern. Much of the time for dialogue with others must have been spent on establishing the rationale of our position on the border.
Afghanistan turned out to be a bigger crisis than expected, with the Taliban’s walkover in Kabul. India appeared to be the sole defender of the Americans against Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia and others. Bringing some civility to the Taliban in Kabul became a high priority in the face of a Pakistan-China-Taliban axis with some support from Russia and Iran. Wherever the Prime Minister and EAM appeared either in person or on virtual platforms, priority was given to Afghanistan and anti-terrorism rather than Chinese expansionism.
Climate change, United Nations reform, and charges of India being only a part-democracy also demanded attention, but the Indian interest in these areas did not appear as urgent and crucial as in the other areas. India threatened to stand out of the line on the matter of net-zero emission target years, but succumbed to the pressure to commit more on promoting renewable energy and phasing down of coal. UN reform was not going anywhere and there was no need to concede on our position on expansion of the Security Council. As for Indian democracy, the Prime Minister’s assertion that India is the “mother of democracy” and the EAM’s primacy of governance went uncontested at the political level.
What made Indian diplomacy hectic during the year was a distinct change of style of openness and readiness to deal with friends and foes alike. From selective alignment, India moved to universal engagement, even to the extent of convening meetings with antagonists. Engagements with the U.S. went beyond familiarisation with the new government to increased commitment to Quad and acceptance of AUKUS and formation of the ‘western Quad’, with the U.S., Israel and the UAE.
The engagement with China at the level of commanders and diplomats was intense, and ministerial interaction continued even when China tore up many fundamental agreements that sustained the dialogue for many years. Major agreements were signed with Russia, despite the American threat of CAATSA against S-400 missiles and the Russian inclination to align with China in the days to come. Patience, diligence and firmness rather than reaching conclusions through concessions were the ingredients of Indian strategy. India attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, where a sub-group led by China took its own decisions on Afghanistan. We also attended a meeting of Russia, China and India. Such an approach demanded high-level personal involvement at the senior levels.
Perhaps because of the unique geopolitical situation, India gave particular importance to its presidency of the UN Security Council in August 2021. Unprecedented in the history of the UN, an event at the Security Council was chaired by the Prime Minister. India also brought global issues of particular importance to the agenda of the month. Significant inputs were provided during discussions on issues like maritime security, peacekeeping and anti-terrorism for active consideration in the future. Although it is illusory to believe that the way has been cleared for India’s permanent membership of the Security Council, India’s diplomatic capabilities and its commitment to the UN were demonstrated yet again.
The Foreign Secretary’s visit to Myanmar to engage the military junta at a time when Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders are in prison may raise eyebrows in many countries, but this is another instance of India’s readiness to engage those in power to explore possibilities of friendship and co-operation. The intention is to prevent China from having a field day in Myanmar.
Two major challenges
Sadly, the extraordinary efforts made by India have not been fruitful in the cases of China and Afghanistan. China has not shown willingness to disengage in Ladakh and withdraw to the previous positions behind the Line of Actual Control. But the expectation is that China will take a more reasonable approach once the current convulsions end with the beginning of another term for President Xi Jinping. He cannot afford to show any sign of weakness in his external and internal policies at this critical time.
As for Afghanistan, the haul may be longer, given the stubbornness of the Taliban and its proclivity to endanger its own people for the purity of faith. The international community is already moving in the direction of rescuing the regime by providing humanitarian assistance even without any change in the repressive regime. India has a formidable challenge in Afghanistan, regardless of its open and universal engagement with all concerned. But India’s new style of diplomacy will have an impact in shaping the world of the future.
T.P. Sreenivasan is former Ambassador of India and Governor for India of the IAEA
Patchwork policy
The temporary rollback of tax hikes on textiles is a harbinger of challenges before GST regime
On New Year’s eve, nine hours before a new GST rate of 12% was to kick in for readymade garments and fabrics, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced that the plan is off and the existing 5% rate will continue into 2022, or at least for its first quarter. The decision was made at an emergency meeting of the GST Council, which had approved the higher tax on textiles at its last meeting in September 2021 to correct the anomaly of an inverted duty structure. While the GST rate on manmade fibre is 18% and yarn made from the same is taxed at 12%, the rate on the final fabric was 5%, ostensibly creating a headache for textile producers which the Council had sought to alleviate. The move to raise that rate to 12%, along with that on footwear costing less than ₹1,000 a pair, had been on the Council’s agenda for over a year but had been kept on hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s adverse effects on households. Explaining the rethink to hold off the rate hikes that were to become effective January 1, the Finance Minister indicated that the original decision was arrived at after several parleys that explored, among other things, the likely impact on consumers. Yet, a letter from the Gujarat Finance Minister she had received on December 29, along with representations from industry, prompted a review.
Although the rate hike was aimed at helping producers get easier credit for taxes paid on inputs, that is not how it was seen by several players in an industry that has historically been one of India’s largest employment creators and contributes around 2% to the overall economy. Last month, many lathes in the textile industry were left idling for a day, in what may be the first ever strike that has not been triggered by industrial unrest in the sector that last witnessed debilitating strikes from labour unions in the 1980s. Those protests, along with some States’ missives to the Centre, warning of significant factory closures and job losses, had failed to move the needle and the industry had resigned itself to the new rates. Perhaps, it was fortuitous that most State Finance Ministers, who are members of the Council, were already expected in the capital for a consultation on the Union Budget for 2022-23. A ministerial group already tasked with rationalising inverted duty structures across products and reviewing the multiple rate slabs of the GST regime, has now been assigned the additional task to suggest an appropriate structure for textile products; it has two more months to finalise its report. It is unlikely that these broader corrections will take place before the coming State Assembly polls conclude and this time could be used for wider consultations with industry, consumers and States before pencilling in new rates and avoiding such about-turns. The course correction needs to be navigated more deftly and with greater purpose, if India hopes to revive private investments. Pegasus: SC panel tells people to report if they were targets
Citizens can inform by email if they suspect surveillance through their devices
Legal Correspondent NEW DELHI
The technical committee examining the Pegasus spyware allegations has issued a public notice inviting citizens to come forward if they suspect that their mobile phones or instruments have been infected with the Israeli military grade malware.
The committee, overseen by former Supreme Court judge, Justice R.V. Raveendran, said citizens should make it clear whether they would let the committee further examine their phones or instruments if “reasonable cause” is found that they are infected.
Citizens who believe they were victims of Pegasus snooping should write to the technical committee at inquiry@pegasus-india-investigation.in by January 7 noon. They should give detailed reasons to substantiate their suspicions. News reports had said a cross-section of people from journalists, activists, parliamentarians, government officials, lawyers and even court staffers were targetted using Pegasus.
In case the suspicions ring true and deserve further examination, the mobile phones and instruments would be collected by the committee in Delhi and digital phone images of the records collected would be provided to their owners.
Wide mandate
The job cut out for the committee is to “enquire, investigate and determine” whether the “Pegasus suite of spyware was used on phones or other devices of the citizens of India to access stored data, eavesdrop on conversations, intercept information and/or for any other purposes”. The committee also has to get the “details of the victims and/or persons affected by such a spyware attack”.
The other questions for the committee include whether Pegasus was used by the Centre or State or any of their agencies against their own citizens, and if used, was it authorised and under what law or procedure.
The Supreme Court Bench led by Chief Justice of India N.V. Ramana wanted the committee to dive deep into the first public signs of the alleged use of the military-grade spyware years ago. The court had wanted the committee to dig up the steps taken by the government “after reports were published in the year 2019 about hacking of WhatsApp accounts using the Pegasus suite of spyware”.
The court also wants the committee to use its expertise to test the existing surveillance laws and procedures to see how much they value and protect citizens’ privacy. The court said the committee should come up with recommendations to prevent State and non-State players from invading the fundamental right of privacy of citizens through illegal surveillance mounted on them.
The court has also asked the Justice Raveendran panel to come up with suggestions for enhancing and improving the cyber security of the nation and its assets. Noting that there should not be any delay in protecting citizens from malicious spyware attacks, the court had even asked the committee to suggest an ad hoc arrangement that could be passed by the Supreme Court as an interim measure until the Parliament came up with a law.
Draft national air sports policy pushes for safety standards
JAGRITI CHANDRANew Delhi
The government on Sunday released a draft national policy for air sports in the country that will require entities providing these services and their equipment to be registered, as well as be liable for penalties.
The policy proposes a two-tier governance structure for air sports in the country, which will include an apex governing body called the Air Sports Federation of India (ASFI) and associations for each air sport. It will cover activities like aerobatics, aeromodelling, amateur-built and experimental aircraft, ballooning, drones, gliding, hang gliding, paragliding, microlighting, paramotoring, skydiving, and vintage aircraft.
The ASFI will be an autonomous body under the Ministry of Civil Aviation and will represent India at the Lausanne-headquartered Fédération Aéronaautique Internationale (FAI) and other global platforms related to air sports. It will provide governance over various aspects of air sports, including regulation, certification, competitions, awards and penalties.
Each air sports association will lay down its safety standards for equipment, infrastructure, personnel and training, and specify the disciplinary actions to be taken in case of non-compliance. Inability to do so may lead to penal action by the ASFI.
Registration required
All persons and entities providing air sports services will be required to register as members of the respective air sports associations. Key equipment used will also have to be registered.
It is proposed that popular air sports attractions in the country such as Bir Billing in Himachal Pradesh, Gangtok in Sikkim, Hadapsar in Maharashtra and Vagamon in Kerala can be declared as a “control zone” for air sports in order to ensure the safety of other manned aircraft.
Schools and colleges will be encouraged to include air sports in their curriculum and their students will have the opportunity to participate in the FAI’s international competitions.
The draft policy also aims to promote domestic design, development and manufacturing of air sports equipment under the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan; waive import duty on equipment for a few years; as well as request the GST Council to consider rationalising the GST rate on air sports equipment to 5% or less.
‘Malabar is the most complex naval exercise’
Dinakar Peri NEW DELHI
While the Navy gears up to hold its largest multilateral exercise ‘Milan’ at the end of February, there are requests from several countries for various formats of exercises, defence officials said, pointing out that Malabar is the most complex naval exercise India does with any other country.
Meanwhile, China continues to expand its presence and assistance in the region, the latest being the delivery of Ming class diesel-electric submarine to Myanmar, its second submarine after the first one given by India.
“The tempo of exercises has been very high last few years and more and more countries want to exercise with us,” one defence official said. This could see some consolidation with expansion of existing bilateral or trilateral exercises into larger formats, which could bring down the overall number while increasing the engagements, an official stated.
These engagements are further amplified by the bilateral logistics agreements, Navy to Navy agreements and information sharing agreements that India has concluded with several countries. Some countries require a Navy to Navy agreement for their bureaucratic process, the official explained.
India also exchanges maritime Information bilaterally with friendly foreign countries to create Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Indian Ocean Region.
With recent overtures, India, China eye stability in ties after a year of tensions
Exchange of sweets at border, Chinese Foreign Minister’s talks with Indian envoy, and booming trade between the two sides raise hopes of a peaceful relationship
Ananth Krishnan Suhasini Haidar HONG KONG/NEW DELHI
The exchange of sweets at 10 posts along the India-China border on New Year’s Day and recent talks between the two sides have indicated that New Delhi and Beijing are seeking greater stability in relations and haven’t given up hopes of a breakthrough, despite the massive 1,00,000-strong troops still amassed on both sides after nearly 20 months of a stand-off and a continuing stalemate in disengagement.
The hopes of 2021, when the two sides agreed to disengage and withdraw troops from Pangong lake in February, including the heights on the Kailash range taken by the Indian army just months prior, and at Gogra, were belied later in the year. According to officials, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has refused to budge on India’s demand that they restore status quo ante by withdrawing from other areas like Demchok, Hot Springs and Depsang plains.
Unexpected talks
Even so, the exchanges on January 1, several rounds of talks between diplomats and military commanders, and an unexpectedly upbeat farewell video conference between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the outgoing Indian Ambassador Vikram Misri last month, where both sides spoke of uninterrupted communication as the “silver lining” around the dark clouds that engulf bilateral relations which are perhaps at their worst point since the 1980s, are indications of both sides seeking an improvement. It is particularly significant that the exchanges took place in areas such as Demchok and Depsang that saw PLA troops occupy land claimed by India, leading to criticisms that the Modi government may be looking to agree to a compromise in these areas.
That Mr. Wang chose to speak with Mr. Misri, and moreover, that the Chinese Foreign Ministry sought to publicise the meeting despite the state of relations and the recently shrill rhetoric from the state media in China, was also seen by observers as significant. Mr. Misri has now taken over as Deputy National Security Adviser. “Even though certain challenges since last year had overpowered the vast opportunities in the relationship, he was hopeful that with continued communication at all levels, the two sides would be able to resolve the current difficulties”, a readout from the Indian Embassy said.
Another positive sign came in December after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Delhi, and Mr. Putin’s virtual conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping later in the same month. A senior Kremlin aide said the leaders had discussed holding a Russia-India-China trilateral in the “near future”, a possibility the Ministry of External Affairs has neither confirmed nor denied.
Regardless of the possibilities, the situation at the LAC remains fraught with risk, given the likelihood of a recurrence of violence with both disengagement and de-escalation nowhere near completed, and an official said that the most they can hope for is that ties “stabilise” in the coming year as the Indian army attempts to hold off Beijing’s territorial aggressions. As of Sunday evening, Beijing’s official media was yet to mention the New Year’s Day exchange, and instead, state media outlets shared a video from Galwan Valley showing PLA troops there pledging to protect “every inch” of Chinese territory.
New border law
Beijing is also pushing ahead with bolstering its infrastructure in border areas and has passed a new border law that came into effect on January 1. The law calls on government agencies in China to take steps to “safeguard sovereignty”.
Beijing has also accelerated plans to build civilian “frontier” villages, including in disputed areas, while the Chinese government on December 30 issued new “standardised” names for 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh, to be used on Chinese maps, ahead of the law coming into effect.
With the boundary stalemate, ties in other areas have come to a standstill. Curbs on Chinese investment have seen Chinese FDI to India plummet.
Trade ties
Bilateral trade has, however, continued to boom, and in 2021 reached the highest ever. After 11 months of the year, two-way trade reached $114.26 billion, with Chinese exports to India touching a whopping $87.9 billion and Indian exports accounting for $26.35 billion, both record figures, according to China’s General Administration of Customs.
The News Editorial Analysis 2nd Jan 2022
